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harming an innocent person for no reason, then this action 
is morally wrong. What is the relationship between the nat-
ural properties of the action and the moral property of its 
being wrong?
The naturalistic response to these worries is straightfor-
ward: when it comes to morals, there is just one kind of 
property involved, namely natural properties. Any worries 
about how moral properties fit into a natural world are ill-
founded. As a consequence, the claim that there are moral 
properties needs to be interpreted in some other way. A 
naturalistic moral realist will claim that there are moral 
properties, but propose that they are either entirely reduc-
ible to natural ones or ontologically continuous with nat-
ural ones. A naturalistic expressivist might think that talk 
of moral properties is nothing but an expression of one’s 
subjective attitude and a response to an action’s natural 
features. A constructivist along Kantian lines, by contrast, 
would say that talk of moral properties ought to be taken 
seriously because it is practically necessary for exercising 
one’s agency as a rational and moral subject in our natu-
ral world. Whatever interpretation is given on a naturalistic 
view, such a view yields the result that moral properties do 
not exist in their own right, but exist only by way of reduc-
tion to something else.
The non-naturalistic response to these worries is less 
straightforward: first, non-naturalistic moral realists have 
had a hard time spelling out the connection between natural 
and moral properties. Is this connection one of superveni-
ence? Constitution? Grounding? Brute co-variation? Sec-
ond, they must ward off the objection that moral properties 
are entities “of a very strange sort, utterly different from 
anything else in the universe”1 because of their apparent 
inherently prescriptive nature.
1 Mackie (1977, 38).
Abstract Several non-naturalist philosophers look for 
ways to maintain the objectivity of morals without mak-
ing any (robust) ontological commitments. Recently Derek 
Parfit proposed an account of non-ontologically existing 
irreducible moral properties. My first aim in this paper is to 
outline that such an account is doomed to fail. My second 
aim in this paper is to argue that irreducible moral prop-
erties can be integrated with adaptions into an ontological 
framework such as E.J. Lowe’s four-category ontology. 
If it can be shown that irreducible moral properties have 
a proper place in such an ontology, then there is no need 
to distinguish between an ontological and non-ontologi-
cal mode of existence, which, in turn helps to eschew the 
obscurities that this distinction brings in its wake.
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1 Introduction
Contemporary discussions of moral realism are strongly 
influenced by Mackie’s argument from queerness. The 
argument has two prongs: one epistemological, and one 
ontological. The epistemological prong directs our atten-
tion to the question of how we are able to access moral 
properties if these are different from natural ones. The 
ontological prong asks how moral properties fit into our 
natural world. If an action is an instance of deliberately 
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These issues have led several non-naturalist philoso-
phers to look for ways to maintain the objectivity of morals 
without making any (robust) ontological commitments. 
Thomas Nagel’s view of objective values is one example of 
such an attempt.2 Nagel explicitly states that values, in 
order to be objective, must be objective in their own right, 
and not in anything else. However, he warns against draw-
ing any ontological conclusions from this view, such as 
understanding values in terms of Platonist forms.3 Nagel 
does not posit any moral entities over and above the natural 
entities in the world. Rather, he suggests that moral realism 
consists in a detached conception of life and the world 
which ideally corrects our egocentric desires and other idi-
osyncratic features of our particular perspective. In doing 
so, it enables us to discern normative reasons which tell us, 
rightly, how we should act. Nagel’s strategy is thus to 
explain the objectivity of values by relying on an epistemic 
notion of objectivity rather than an ontological theory of 
values. He thinks that the existence of objective normative 
reasons does not require substantive ontological 
commitments.4
A non-ontological version of non-naturalistic moral 
realism along Nagel’s lines is attractive for several rea-
sons. First, it is easier to defend (and to accept) because 
it incurs no ontological burden. Second, due to its lack of 
any ontological commitments, such a view allows us to 
address explanatory questions about the prescriptive nature 
of moral facts in purely normative terms. The normative 
realm is no longer held hostage by naturalistic realism or by 
ontological objections derived from such realism.
Yet the claim that there are objective values or norma-
tive truths whose existence carries no ontological weight is 
difficult to parse. My first aim in this paper is to highlight 
this difficulty by outlining one prominent proposal–Derek 
Parfit’s recent non-ontological account of irreducible moral 
properties. The second aim is to argue that irreducible 
moral properties can be straightforwardly integrated into 
an ontological framework. Here I make use of E. J. Lowe’s 
well-known four-category ontology. If it can be shown that 
irreducible moral properties have a proper place in such an 
ontology, an answer to Mackie’s argument from queerness 
2 Svavarsdóttir (2007) provides a detailed discussion of Nagel’s 
account.
3 Nagel (1986, 139).
4 Scanlon (2003, 9), holds a similar view. He writes: “It might be 
said that moral judgments, if they were understood as making truth 
claims, would involve metaphysical claims that go beyond what is 
guaranteed merely by their correctness according to ordinary moral 
criteria: to claim that they are true would be to claim for them an 
‘intrinsic metaphysical gravitas’. […] But moral judgments as I 
understand them do not depend on such a view of the world, nor do 
they need the support of other metaphysical claims. […] The kind of 
gravitas that they require is thus not metaphysical but normative.”
can be given. Then philosophers might be less reluctant to 
posit irreducible moral properties, which, in turn, helps to 
avoid having to distinguish between ontological and non-
ontological existence and thus also to eschew the obscuri-
ties that this distinction brings in its wake.
2  Parfit’s Ontology of Moral Properties
Parfit offers the following answer to the objection that 
moral properties are a very strange sort of entity. If we con-
sider sentences such as
i. The planet Venus exists.
ii. There are four vipers in this plastic container.
iii. There are three prime numbers between one and five.
iv. Ohm’s law existed before it was first formulated by 
Ohm.
v. The symphony “Eroica” has existed ever since Bee-
thoven wrote it in 1802/03.
vi. The possible course of action of my going for a hike 
tomorrow exists.
vii. The number seven is blue.
viii. There exists a triangle with four sides.
then we might come to believe that different meanings 
of “to exist” are involved here. Most people would agree 
that the entities mentioned in (i) and (ii) exist. There is little 
doubt that the planet Venus, plastic containers and snakes 
exist. As material entities they are easily accessible—we 
can see, touch, and study them. We are able to experience 
their causal impact in one way or another. Similarly, most 
people would hold that an entity such as the one posited in 
(viii) does not exist because strong reasons speak for the 
metaphysical impossibility of a triangle to have a greater 
or smaller number of sides than three. Likewise, the item 
in (vii) cannot possibly exist because numbers—as all 
other abstract entities—are neither blue nor colored more 
generally.
However, people become less certain when asked 
whether the items in (iii)—(vi) exist. (iii) is clearly a true 
statement, but in what sense do entities like numbers exist? 
They do not exist in space and time, and therefore one 
might be inclined to say that their existence appears onto-
logically less robust than that of material objects. What 
about the item in (iv)? There is no doubt that Ohm’s law is 
valid. Since it depends on the existence of conductors and 
their specific properties, once again, one might claim that 
its mode of existence is less robust than that of the material 
objects on which it depends. One might find it reasonable 
to ascribe an even less robust mode of existence to a sym-
phony, because its existence depends in a yet more radical 
way on its composer than Ohm’s law does on the material 
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objects. A natural law, we can claim, obtains independently 
of us; it is there for us to discover. A symphony, by contrast, 
must—like any other artifact—be invented by us. Similarly, 
we might say that not only the coming into being as such 
but also the continuous existence of artifacts depends on 
people perceiving them as these specific artifacts. Once 
people have disappeared from this planet and all traces of 
human civilization have vanished, then it seems right to say 
that the Eroica has gone out of existence whereas the state 
of affairs described by Ohm’s law continue to hold. Finally, 
things appear even more complicated with (vi). We are able 
to refer intentionally to possible courses of future actions or 
future states of affairs. Does this ability justify us in believ-
ing that these items have any ontological robustness, even 
though they exist only in the realm of the possible?
The conclusions one draws will depend on one’s funda-
mental ontological views. Two important ontological views 
are what Parfit calls “actualism” and “possibilism”. Actual-
ism says that
[t]o be, or to exist, is to be actual, so there cannot be 
anything that is merely possible.5
According to actualism, the entities in (i), (ii), (iv) and 
(v) exist, because “to exist” means to exist at some particu-
lar instant. Disputable, instead, is the ontological status of 
abstract entities like numbers as in (iii), for abstract enti-
ties are not possible entities but they exist outside time and 
space.
Possibilism, by contrast, is the view that
[t]here are some things that are never actual, but are 
merely possible. There are some things that might 
happen but never actually happen, and some things 
that might exist but never actually exist.6
An advocate of possibilism does not reject the existence 
of actual entities. He or she claims that such entities do 
not exhaust what there is in the world. On this view, actual 
entities exist in an ontologically different way from merely 
possible ones.
Returning to our list of statements, a possibilist would 
surely embrace (i), (ii) and (iv)–(vi). It is unclear what he 
or she should say about (iii), because, although abstract 
objects such as numbers do not exist in an actual sense as 
concrete objects do, they are not merely possible uninstan-
tiated entities either.
Parfit supports possibilism by the insight that we are 
able to compare different possible courses of action and 
that we might be happy to have chosen one course over 
another. Racking our brains over which possible action to 
5 Parfit (2011, 467).
6 Parfit (2011, 467).
choose, and being happy or sad about the one we have cho-
sen, would hardly be justified if there were no other possi-
ble courses of action for us to choose against.
Another important distinction which Parfit discusses is 
“the single-sense view” and “the plural-senses view”. The 
former says that
[t]he words ‘there are’ and ‘exist’ must always be 
used in the same single sense.7
This view fits well with actualism. Since actualism says 
that only actualized entities exist, all of these entities exist 
in one and the same sense.
The plural-senses view, for its part, claims that
[t]here is one wide, general sense in which we can 
claim that there are certain things, or that these things 
exist. We can also use these words in other, narrower 
senses. For example, if we say that certain things 
exist in what I shall call the narrow actualist sense, 
we mean that these things actually exist as concrete 
parts of the spatio-temporal world.8
The plural-senses view fits well with possibilism. Once 
we accept different senses in which entities can exist, it is 
only a small step toward accepting that possible entities 
exist, albeit in a different sense from actual ones. In this 
case one might claim that both kinds of entities exist in the 
wide general sense, but only the narrow actualist sense of 
existence can be ascribed to concrete entities.
Parfit embraces both possibilism and the plural-senses 
view. This allows him the greatest possible ontological 
flexibility: a liberal ontology such as this can include possi-
ble entities, because the main question is not what kinds of 
entities possibly exist, but rather how they exist.9 That this 
“how” question has utmost importance for Parfit becomes 
clear in his discussion of the ontological status of abstract 
objects. Abstract entities are neither possible nor concrete. 
They exist in a robust but abstract sense.10 However, it is 
not clear what it might mean to say that they exist in a simi-
lar sense to that of concrete entities except that the former 
are outside of space and time. Parfit suggests that there 
might be no determinate answer to the question of whether 
abstract objects exist at all.11
7 Parfit (2011, 469).
8 Parfit (2011, 469).
9 See Parfit (2011, 474).
10 Parfit (2011, 745), writes: “[…] unlike entities that are merely pos-
sible, some of these abstract entities can be claimed to be actual in 
another, wider sense”.
11 Parfit (2011, 476–479). Such a claim might be less surprising than 
one is first inclined to think, for some questions—as the sorites-par-




If taken for granted, however, this agnostic claim can 
still fit well with a form of cognitivism. Cognitivism, gen-
erally understood, is the thesis that some kind of claim can 
be true or false independently of our attitudes and states of 
mind. If I claim that a glass of wine is on the table before 
me, then this claim is true if a specific ontological fact 
holds, namely, that there is indeed a glass of wine on the 
table before me. Parfit dubs this view “metaphysical cog-
nitivism about truth”, because the truth conditions for such 
a claim require a specific ontological state of affairs to 
obtain. However, there are also truths which do not depend 
in any way on us or on any other concrete things—think of 
the necessary truth of logical or mathematical truths. For 
Parfit, such truths do not involve any ontological mysteries, 
because there are no states of affairs which correspond to 
them. He thus contrasts metaphysical with non-metaphysi-
cal cognitivism; the latter says that
[t]here are some claims that are, in the strongest 
sense, true, but these truths have no positive ontologi-
cal implications.12
Thus, according to non-metaphysical cognitivism one 
might claim that X is true, and there is some sense in which 
X exists but this sense of X’s existence has no ontologi-
cal meaning. It is true that there are three prime numbers 
between one and five. This truth-claim commits its propo-
nent to the claim that numbers and their specific properties 
exist in some non-ontological sense.
In the light of these reflections Parfit distinguishes 
between three different meanings of “to exist” that are rele-
vant for present purposes. Concrete entities exist in the nar-
row actualist sense; possible entities exist in a wide sense; 
and abstract entities exist
not only in the wide sense, but also in a distinctive, 
non-ontological sense.13
The crucial insight is that, according to non-metaphysi-
cal cognitivism, a claim can be true in itself and not in vir-
tue of certain states of affairs obtaining. That is,
[t]ruths need only be true.14
Parfit applies this thesis to irreducibly normative claims 
by way of an analogical argument. He writes:
There are some claims that are irreducibly normative 
in the reason-involving sense, and are in the strongest 
12 Parfit (2011, 479).
13 Parfit (2011, 480). I take it that Parfit has this sort of threefold dis-
tinction in mind, even though he is not entirely clear about whether 
possible uninstantiated entities, such as a possible palace, exist in the 
wide non-ontological sense or in a wide ontological sense.
14 Parfit (2011, 482).
sense true. […] For such claims to be true, these rea-
son-involving properties need not exist either as natu-
ral properties in the spatio-temporal world, or in some 
non-spatio-temporal part of reality.15
Hence, irreducible normative truths are solely and exclu-
sively true in themselves; neither natural facts nor irreduc-
ible normative ones are needed for making them true.
2.1  A Critical Assessment of Parfit’s Account
Here is a brief summary of Parfit’s non-metaphysical 
cognitivism:
1. There are true normative statements.
2. The normativity of normative statements consists in 
irreducibly normative concepts which are reason-
involving and which belong to their own specific kind.
3. The truth of normative statements implies neither any 
ontological commitments nor the existence of natural 
or normative properties which serve as truth-makers 
for these statements.
I will present two questions about this account. The first 
concerns the conception of truth it involves. The second 
asks whether and how true normative statements can exist 
without having any ontological implications.
The first question can be rephrased as follows: suppos-
ing that the non-metaphysical cognitivist is right that there 
are true normative statements, how do these statements dif-
fer from normative statements that are not true? Since the 
non-metaphysical cognitivist is committed to objective nor-
mative truths, relativist theories of truth (such as pragmatic 
or coherentist accounts) are unsuitable from the outset. The 
account of first resort for moral realists is generally the cor-
respondence theory of truth. Accordingly, the truth of true 
statements consists in a correspondence to how things are 
“out there”. A statement’s being true is a relational prop-
erty consisting in the correspondence between some part 
of reality and the propositional content of the statement. 
Fortunately, getting a grip on the notion of truth needed by 
non-metaphysical cognitivism does not require extensive 
details concerning how to spell out this notion of corre-
spondence. If true normative statements have no ontologi-
cal implications, then there is simply no part of reality to 
which such statements correspond.
In a recent article Suikkanen analyses the prospects of 
operating with a different notion of truth, namely deflation-
ism.16 Deflationism says that truth has no specific “deeper” 
15 Parfit (2011, 486).
16 Suikkanen (2016).
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nature; it consists neither in a specific relation nor a par-
ticular property. No corresponding fact must hold, nor must 
a true statement cohere with a set of other statements, nor 
is truth the outcome of an ideal rational inquiry. The state-
ment “This spider is poisonous”, is true just in case the spi-
der is poisonous, full stop. The truth predicate enables us to 
step away from talking about language and toward talking 
about reality. However, as Suikkanen points out, such a 
deflationist notion of truth puts non-metaphysical cognitiv-
ists in a predicament:
If they understand normative facts in a deflationist way, 
they cannot distinguish their view from non-naturalistic 
moral realism. The reason is that they are no longer entitled 
to claim that, since there are no irreducible normative facts 
to serve as truth-makers, non-naturalistic moral realists are 
wrong about moral statements. After all, non-metaphysical 
cognitivists already suppose that talk of normative facts is 
just a more cumbersome (and tentatively misleading) way 
to express the insight that non-naturalistic moral realism 
does not go beyond the ontological commitments of non-
metaphysical cognitivism. A deflationist understanding of 
normative facts does not add anything to the ontology of 
deflationist non-metaphysical cognitivism.
To avoid such a consequence, a non-metaphysical cogni-
tivist might suggest an inflationist understanding of norma-
tive facts. According to such an understanding, if norma-
tive facts existed then they would be part of reality, but in 
fact—the claim goes—no such facts exist. But a view com-
bining deflationism about truth with inflationism about nor-
mative facts seems to collapse into an error theory. Such a 
theory holds that ordinary moral statements involve a built-
in claim to normative objectivity which non-cognitivism 
and naturalism fail to capture, but that this claim is always 
false because there are no irreducible normative facts.17
An inflationist non-metaphysical cognitivist also holds 
that ordinary moral statements are objective, but he denies 
that this claim to objectivity has any ontological implica-
tions. Thus, the error theorist’s world is ontologically indis-
tinguishable from the non-metaphysical cognitivist’s; nor 
do their understandings of the nature of normative claims 
seem to differ. Nevertheless, a non-metaphysical cognitiv-
ist aims at clearly distinguishing her account from an error 
theory. As Parfit remarks, moral truths need only be true; 
it is here that error theory parts ways from non-metaphys-
ical cognitivism because error theory denies that there are 
any such truths. Therefore, non-metaphysical cognitiv-
ism requires a theory of truth which is more robust than 
deflationism because it presupposes a truth property which 
marks the difference to error theory. In particular, a non-
metaphysical cognitivist notion of truth has the following 
17 Mackie (1977, 48–49).
features: truth is (i) a non-natural property, which (ii) does 
not involve any correspondence-like ontological commit-
ments, (iii) is genuinely stance-independent in contrast to 
relativist accounts, and (iv) is robust enough to avoid col-
lapsing into error theory. These requirements smack of 
primitivism about truth: if normative statements are true, 
then they are true in a way that is irreducible, simple, sui 
generis and non-ontological.
If non-metaphysical cognitivism was meant to be less 
queer than non-naturalistic moral realism supposedly is, 
then we might wonder whether the appeal to primitivism 
about normative truth succeeds at this aim. The claim that 
normative statements are true in virtue of irreducibly nor-
mative properties is comprehensible, even if it conflicts 
with our other knowledge about the world and must conse-
quently be rejected.18 Primitivism about truth, however, is 
hardly even comprehensible to begin with. It has queerness 
written all over it.
The second question asks: what does it mean to claim 
that there are true normative statements with no ontological 
implications? Surely, if a normative statement is true, then 
certain things would follow from it, ontologically speak-
ing. Consider the statement that Professor Q’s lectures are 
instructive and enjoyable and you should therefore attend 
them. This statement has a normative character and presup-
poses (i) that Professor Q exists, (ii) that he is giving lec-
tures, and (iii) that his lectures have the properties of being 
instructive and enjoyable.
Or suppose that it is true that there is someone who sup-
ports the poor and because of this she is morally good. This 
is a moral statement and if it is true, then it provides every-
one who can afford to support the poor with a reason to do 
so. This statement too has several ontological implications, 
namely that there are (i) people who can afford to support 
the poor, (ii) poor people in need of support, (iii) actions 
involving support of the poor, (iv) the normative property 
of being good, and (v) the normative reason for supporting 
the poor, namely that one should do so.
At this point Parfit might specify that he is not denying 
wholesale that true normative statements have ontological 
implications. Rather, his claim is merely that it is crucial to 
distinguish between ontological implications regarding the 
natural realm and alleged ontological implications regard-
ing the normative realm. Given the plural-sense view, of 
the previously mentioned implications, (iv) and (v) concern 
the normative realm and therefore exist in a distinctive, 
non-ontological sense, whereas (i)–(iii) exist in the narrow 
actualist sense.
18 Mackie (1977, 48), for instance, speculates that the existence of 
irreducible normative facts could be defended with recourse to God 
but that such a defense is not viable since theism cannot be defended.
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Thus, the central question is what it means for normative 
truths to exist in a non-ontological sense. Parfit for his part 
uses the following example to motivate an ontologically 
layered understanding of reality ending with a non-ontolog-
ical sense of existence:
There was a palace designed by Wren to replace the 
burnt Palace of Whitehall, but this palace was not 
built and never actually existed.19
According to Parfit, an advocate of the single-sense 
view would have to claim that there existed a palace that 
was never built and that therefore—in the same univocal 
sense of “exist”—the palace never existed, which is a con-
tradiction. However, there are various ways to avoid such a 
contradiction. An actualist might say that the above claim 
must be re-interpreted because (merely) possible entities 
do not exist. What there was, ontologically speaking, was 
a design for a palace and a mental representation in Wren’s 
mind. Alternatively, a friend of possible objects might say 
that Wren’s possible palace exists but remains uninstanti-
ated; that is, that, in one and the same sense of “exist”, no 
actual palace exists. These alternative ways to interpret the 
alleged existence of possible objects indicate that Parfit’s 
plural-sense view is insufficiently motivated.
In addition—and this objection appears stronger—a 
plural-sense view will hardly convince philosophers who 
regard the existence of possible objects as ontologically 
obscure that the attribution of an ontologically lower-
grade existence makes possible objects less ontologically 
obscure. The problem is the very concept of a possible 
entity, and hence any mode of existence such an entity 
might enjoy will appear as problematic too. Metaphysicians 
who reject realism about numbers do so because they find 
the very idea of a mind-independent number ontologically 
obscure. To claim that numbers exist after all but in a dif-
ferent way than concrete entities will be of no help here; on 
the contrary, this claim will increase the mystery, since it 
implies that things can exist non-ontologically.
To further illuminate the problematic notion of non-
ontological existence, compare Parfit’s non-metaphysical 
cognitivism with moral error theory. Parfit’s account does 
not share the error theory’s conclusion that there are no 
irreducibly normative truths. Accordingly, non-metaphysi-
cal cognitivism appears to be richer than the error theory in 
some sense, since the former takes reality to consist of nat-
ural entities as well as normative truths. Interestingly, how-
ever, on the ontological level there is no difference between 
an error theory and Parfit’s account; for Parfit claims that 
normative truths bear no ontological weight. One might 
be puzzled, then, about what the difference between these 
19 Parfit (2011, 470).
two views amounts to. For it is sensible to assume that the 
world according to error theory should bear some marked 
difference from the world according to Parfit’s non-meta-
physical cognitivism.
In summary, Parfit’s non-metaphysical cognitivism 
tries to avoid significant ontological costs by arguing that, 
although irreducibly normative truths exist, they do so in 
a non-ontological sense. As I have argued, however, it is 
anything but clear what it means for something to exist in 
this way. Parfit seems to introduce a third, non-ontological 
realm of reality beyond the concrete and the abstract; but 
this posit, far from demystifying the existence of irreduc-
ibly normative truths, makes their existence even more 
baffling. Parfit’s proposal fails: first, it fails to provide the 
promised explanation of the non-ontological existence of 
irreducibly normative truth. Second, a notion of non-onto-
logical existence fails to connect with our ordinary views 
of what might exist. Third, it is unclear how a substantive 
debate between naturalistic and non-naturalistic moral real-
ists should be rephrased, if not in terms of ontological dis-
agreements. Therefore, I take it that the price exacted by 
non-metaphysical cognitivism is prohibitive. Non-natural-
istic moral realism is not free of ontological costs, after all.
3  Outlining the Framework for a Moral Ontology
If irreducibly normative properties exist in an ontological 
sense, then one might ask what that sense amounts to. To 
answer this question it makes sense to outline a general 
ontological framework. One such a framework was recently 
worked out in detail by E.J. Lowe. His so-called four cate-
gory ontology is meant primarily to serve as a metaphysical 
foundation for natural science,20 but I submit that, appro-
priately adapted, it can also provide a framework for an 
ontology of the normative. Lowe proposes the following 
fundamental ontological categories: (i) objects or individ-
ual substances; (ii) instantiated properties or modes, (iii) 
kinds and (iv) universal properties or, in Lowe’s terminol-
ogy, attributes. These categories are structurally related to 
each other in the following three ways:
First, the relationship between an individual substance 
and its kind, and the relationship between a (non-substan-
tial) universal attribute and its property-instance, is one of 
instantiation: a particular reef shark is the instantiation of 
the kind “reef shark”, and this shark’s particular aggres-
siveness is an instance of the non-substantial universal 
attribute of aggressiveness.
20 Lowe (2006).
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Second, the relationship between the individual sub-
stance and its particular properties is one of characteri-
zation. The particular aggressiveness characterizes the 
individual reef shark of which it is a mode. A parallel rela-
tionship of characterization can be found at the level of uni-
versals: the universal attribute of aggressiveness character-
izes the kind “reef shark” in a general way. Thus, we might 
say that the relationship of characterization is one between 
instantiated or uninstantiated properties on the one hand 
and substances, respectively kinds, on the other.
Third, the relationship between an individual substance 
and a (non-substantial) universal attribute is one of exem-
plification. Accordingly, a particular reef shark that instan-
tiates the kind “reef shark” is characterized (among other 
features) by this individual’s specific aggressiveness; the 
shark thereby exemplifies the universal attribute of 
aggressiveness.21
At this point one might wonder why an ontology should 
be limited to only these four categories. Suffice it to answer 
this question with two brief reasons offered by Lowe. The 
first is that universals are able to account for natural laws 
and the second is that particulars account for causal rela-
tionships. Let us turn to universals first. Take, for instance, 
the law-like statement that ravens are black. This statement 
expresses that the (universal) attribute of being black char-
acterizes the (substantial) kind “raven”. And the law-like 
statement that electrons and protons attract each other 
expresses that the (universal) attribute of attracting each 
other characterizes the relation between the kind “electron” 
and the kind “proton”. One major advantage of such an 
understanding of natural laws is that it does not imply an 
account of constant conjunctions among particulars, which 
is beset by the problem of how to distinguish between acci-
dental and necessary conjunctions. This understanding of 
natural laws only has implications for how objects falling 
under a specific (substantial) kind tend or are disposed to 
behave in various circumstances, and therefore—a distinc-
tion between accidental and necessary conjunctions is not 
required.22
Let us turn to particulars  now. This raven’s blackness 
explains various things, for instance, its specific heat bal-
ance; its particular instantiation of a shape explains how 
it flys, and its strength explains its social status within its 
flock. Particulars are therefore the most suitable sort of 
entitiy for being causal relata, and a particular substance 
enters into specific causal relationships because of its deter-
minate property-instantiations or modes.
21 Lowe (2006, 111).
22 For a detailed discussion of this conception of natural laws see 
Lowe (2006, 127–136).
This ontological framework thus draws an exhaustive 
and exclusive distinction between universals and particu-
lars. Universals, for their part, are sub-divided into attrib-
utes and kinds. Kind-universals are instantiated by individ-
ual objects, and attribute-universals by properties—which 
are themselves divided into non-relational and relational 
modes. Events, and actions as a specific sub-category of 
events, fit into this ontological scheme as entities depend-
ent on other entities, namely objects and their modes. If a 
particular object changes by losing or acquiring a particular 
property (or both), or if it undergoes a change in some par-
ticular relation it bears with some other particular object 
(i.e., once it assumes a new relation-mode), then an event 
occurs.23
I propose now to apply this ontological framework to 
normative discourse. We may start with the non-naturalistic 
moral realist’s claim that there are irreducible normative 
standards and properties. In the light of the above frame-
work, irreducible normative standards are kind-universals 
and they are characterized by the attributes of being good 
or bad. Here is a first example of how this classification 
works: we may assume that there is a normative standard 
for computers telling us whether a computer is good, that 
is, properly functioning, or not.24 A computer satisfies the 
standard of goodness for computers if it processes quickly, 
does not crash, and has a large memory and a high graphic 
resolution. Thus, the kind “computer” characterized by 
these attributes is a good kind of computer. If the computer 
in my office displays these properties, it instantiates a good 
kind of computer.
Analogously, we can say that there are the moral stand-
ards for actions. These standards specify action-types 
which qualify as morally good or bad and by doing so they 
provide guidelines for agents looking to comport their deci-
sions and actions with the demands of morality. Employing 
Shafer-Landau’s and Cuneo’s concept of a moral fixed 
point, we might identify these standards with such fixed 
points.25 They must find a central place in any moral sys-
tem applying to beings like us in a world like ours because 
they set the boundaries of any competent moral understand-
ing. The application conditions of these standards are deter-
mined by their normative content because they contain in-
built conceptual constraints on what could classify as 
morally good or bad behavior.
Here are a few examples of such moral standards for us: 
the action-type of supporting the poor is characterized by 
the attribute of being morally good. So is the action-type 
23 On this see Lowe (2002, Chap. 12 and 13).
24 The example is taken from FitzPatrick (2006, 186).
25 Cuneo und Shafer-Landau (2014).
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of expressing gratitude to a benefactor. The action-type 
of hurting people for lust, by contrast, is characterized by 
the attribute of being morally wrong. The same applies to 
the action-type of torturing a person for no serious reason. 
Accordingly, if Elias is buying groceries for someone who 
cannot afford them, then his action instantiates the stand-
ard of moral goodness and is characterized by the mode of 
being morally good. If Emile, instead, deliberately offends 
a fellow student for sheer pleasure, then his action instanti-
ates the normative standard of moral badness and is charac-
terized by the mode of being morally bad.
These reflections indicate that an ontological framework 
such as Lowe’s which was primarily designed for natural 
science can also form the basic framework into which an 
ontology of the normative can be slotted. What about the 
argument that normative entities are too queer to be admit-
ted by a scientific worldview? There are many responses to 
this line of thought. I limit myself to three.
3.1  Three Possible Objections
The first response is this: once we acknowledge that univer-
sals have an important role to play in the ontological foun-
dations of natural science, the argument from queerness 
loses much of its force because it is not exclusively directed 
against the existence normative entities. First, consider the 
causal efficacy test against normative entities. It excludes 
normative entities from the table of any serious ontology 
because they do not possess independent causal powers 
but are instead inherently causally inert. But universals 
are causally inert too, since they do not enter into causal 
relations. So, the causal efficacy test excludes universals in 
general from ontology.
Consider now a second objection which is related to the 
first but has an epistemological thrust. It says that we can-
not have any knowledge about normative entities, because 
all knowledge derives from a causal transferal of informa-
tion. If normative entities are causally inert, then there can 
be no causal transferal of information about them. But we 
may respond, as above, that the same goes for universals in 
general. So a causal theory of knowledge is unsuitable as a 
general theory of knowledge; such a theory is inappropri-
ate for knowledge about anything but concrete particulars, 
since these are the only entities capable of entering into 
causal relations. Again, the argument from queerness is not 
directed against normative entities in particular but abstract 
entities in general. If certain kinds of universals, however, 
play an important role in the ontological foundations of 
natural science, then the argument from queerness is too 
coarse-grained because it excludes too much.
Here is my second response: one might suspect that the 
causal-efficacy test imposes an unduly naturalistic stric-
ture on ontology in general with the effect that it promotes 
a better understanding neither of natural science nor of 
human life. I have already advocated accounting for natural 
laws at the abstract level; suffice it here, then, to say the 
following: human life is permeated by normative standards 
telling us what we should do and how we should evaluate 
all kinds of matters. Standards of goodness for comput-
ers tell us how to evaluate computers. A standard for good 
epistemic practice says that we ought to believe the con-
clusions of sound arguments. A standard of prudential rea-
soning says that we should pursue the most efficient means 
for realizing our aims. Such standards are ubiquitous in our 
lives. Moral standards are just one among many other sorts 
of normative standards.
Clearly, none of these standards causes anything of its 
own accord. The most we can say about their causal effi-
cacy is that, once an agent has appropriated these stand-
ards, they might explain this agent’s reasoning, decisions, 
or behavior.26 It is a matter of intense dispute whether we 
can account for this sort of efficacy in causal terms; one rel-
evant question here is whether—if we can account for it 
this way at all—we can only do so by positing another sort 
of causation beyond the mere efficient.27
Regardless of what sense is appropriate for ascrib-
ing causal powers to normative standards, it is reasonable 
to assume that standards exist. Imagine that the epistemic 
principle that one should proportion one’s beliefs to one’s 
evidence is true. This principle is true even if no person in 
fact abides by it. People should follow this principle, but if 
for whatever reason no one does, then it still makes sense, 
given the ontological framework proposed here, to think 
that this principle exists at the universal level even though 
it is not instantiated by any particular performed reasoning 
at the moment.
I conclude that the causal-efficacy test is not suitable as 
a general ontological test, for it excludes from existence 
anything but those concrete particulars which are in some 
way accessible to us in terms of efficient causation. Shafer-
Landau underlines this point when he writes:
[…] the allegiance to the causal test entirely elimi-
nates the normative realm. But this is highly implau-
sible. […] If there is any such thing as a genuine rea-
26 Kim (1998, 78), stresses this point: “For when you deliberate, you 
must call on what you want and believe about the world—your prefer-
ences and information—from your internal perspective, and that’s the 
only thing you can call on. […] Reasons for action, therefore, are nec-
essarily internal reasons, reasons that are cognitively accessible to the 
agent. That is one crucial respect in which reasons for action differ 
from causes of actions: reasons must, but causes need not, be acces-
sible to the agent.”
27 One comprehensive overview of critical voices regarding the 
(standard) “reasons-are-causes”-account can be found in Sandis 
(2009).
Normative Objectivity Without Ontological Commitments? 
1 3
son, the test must fail. Alternatively, if the test is 
retained, then such reasons must be capable of pass-
ing it. And then the causal argument against moral 
facts evaporates.28
Here is the third response: evaluating an object as good 
does not consist in a set of natural properties, and certain 
moral properties supervening on it.29 The same set of natu-
ral properties could be instantiated by many different 
objects, but not all of these properties would consequently 
be considered to be good. A porcelain knife is a good knife 
if it is sharp; but if the edge of a porcelain vase is sharp, 
this would be considered very bad indeed. Hence we may 
say that the fact that a given object is good consists in more 
than just a specific set of natural properties; in addition, 
there are standards of goodness for the kind of object that is 
instantiated by this specific object.
An analogous case can be made for human actions. The 
fact that a human action is morally good consists not merely 
in the set of natural properties constituting the human 
action but also in an appropriate standard of moral good-
ness instantiated by the action in question. Say that Emile 
publicly mocks a fellow student. If this action is considered 
bad, then we may say that its badness does not consist only 
in its natural features, but also in their relationship to some 
appropriate standard of moral goodness for human actions, 
a standard which Emile’s behavior has violated. Fitzpatrick 
emphasizes that, in order to grasp the difference between 
describing and evaluating a behavior, it is decisive that in 
the latter case we are
doing so according to objective standards of the sort 
that could be authoritative for rational agents.30
If this line of reasoning is correct, then natural facts can-
not exhaustively constitute normative facts. Note that this 
account does not involve the claim that Emile’s behavior 
was bad in virtue of being unfair, hardhearted and cruel 
plus one additional normative property X. An explanation 
of the badness of Emile’s behavior is complete as long as 
we refer to the natural features of his behavior. This expla-
nation does not need an additional non-natural property. 
Note also that the assumption of an additional normative 
property does not suggest that the property of badness can 
exist in perfect isolation and independently of the action’s 
natural properties. Rather, the latter determine the norma-
tive property for the action’s moral character (and so they 
do in regard of any other normative properties, such as pru-
dential ones, which the action has). This claim, moreover, 
28 Shafer-Landau (2007, 219).
29 Here I mainly adopt the argument in FitzPatrick (2006, 190–194).
30 FitzPatrick (2006, 189).
is no concession to naturalism about moral ontology. 
Rather, it merely clarifies the specific way in which norma-
tive properties relate, at the level of particulars, to natural 
ones. If no action were performed, then no corresponding 
normative property could be instantiated; so no reference 
to an appropriate standard of goodness for human behavior 
could be made. The claim that an action’s natural features 
are all that is needed to describe what has happened does 
not commit us to a naturalistic account of moral realism. 
Normative properties do not primarily contribute to the 
description and explanation of what has happened—rather, 
they provide an evaluation of it.
The upshot of these considerations is that there are dif-
ferent perspectives involved in describing states of affairs 
which are subject to normative evaluation such as human 
decisions and actions, and it is important to keep them 
separate. To this end Shafer-Landau proposes a distinction 
between the scientific study of nature on the one hand and 
the philosophical inquiry on the other. The former perspec-
tive explains the natural features of Emile’s behavior such 
as its biological, neurological or psychological features, the 
latter perspective offers a moral evaluation of it. He writes:
When trying to verify the basic standards that govern 
the application of moral predicates, we will only sec-
ondarily (if at all) advert to what the physicists and 
botanists and hydrologists say. The conditions under 
which actions are right, and motives and characters 
good, aren’t confirmed by the folks with lab coats. 
They are confirmed, if at all, by those who think phil-
osophically.31
Empirical inquiry, then, is not the right tool for grasping 
normative standards and fleshing them out; the tool we 
need instead is proper ethical reflection. Again: the argu-
ment from queerness starts at the wrong place, because it 
presupposes a purely natural conception of reality as 
default state. It is rather unsurprising, then, that normative 
entities find no natural place in it. However, as rational 
agents our perception of the world is not limited to the 
empirical, but comprises the normative as well. Our per-
ception of the world is inherently normative.32 Thus the 
actions of a rational agent either instantiate or fail to instan-
tiate the normative standards which determine his or her 
conceptual framework.
31 Shafer-Landau (2007, 213).
32 FitzPatrick (2006, 195), says “that many familiar facts and features 
of human life, behavior, and experience, which can be the subject of 
empirical investigation, are also inherently value laden, and as such 
are the source of objective standards of goodness for us—though 
these standards can be properly grasped and specified only through 




The notorious argument from queerness has motivated 
Parfit, among others, to posit irreducible and stance-
independent objective morals which lack any ontological 
underpinning. Parfit’s argument for this proposal appears to 
draw on the venerable metaphysical tradition that there are 
different degrees of existence. However, Parfit’s account 
goes beyond this tradition in arguing for an entirely non-
ontological sense of existence. I have argued that this pro-
ject is doomed to fail. There is no persuasive account of 
non-ontological existence available. Even if it is not utterly 
incoherent, such an account entails a form of “brutism” 
about non-ontological existence which can hardly address 
the worries which the argument from queerness articulates. 
However, as I have argued in the second part of the paper, 
no move towards a non-ontological sense of existence is 
even needed. On the basis of Lowe’s four-category ontol-
ogy I aimed to show how normative entities might figure 
into a comprehensive ontology that allows for both univer-
sals and particulars. Analogously to the ontological status 
of natural kinds and their instantiated particulars, as well 
as to that of universal natural properties and their instan-
tiated modes, it makes sense to think that there exist nor-
mative standards specifying action-types and performed 
human actions as their instantiated particulars, as well as 
characterization relations to universal normative proper-
ties and their instantiated modes. Once universals are taken 
for granted, such a view leads to no particular ontological 
complications. Granted, it expands the ontological universe 
beyond the realm of the merely natural. A naturalist may 
find this ontological inflation objectionable. However, there 
are persuasive reasons in support of an ontology of the nor-
mative along these lines, not least that it is needed in a uni-
verse populated by rational—and as such moral—agents.
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